



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE *(NIO)*

SUBJECT: Report on the Strategic Threat by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

Reference: Draft DCI memorandum for The President, dated 14 May 1974, subject as above.

George:

Thank you for sending me the draft DCI memorandum on the above subject. I appreciate the opportunity to comment on it. I think the memorandum, in general, does an excellent job of evaluating the PFIAB report, however, I would like to offer my observations on three points.

a. I believe that Soviet actions since signing of the Interim Agreement reflect a designed "desire to achieve a margin of superiority if they can," vice an "opportunistic" desire. I believe the Soviets strive diligently to create their own opportunities and I would not wish to convey the notion of happenstance. *"If they can" should also be removed, since desire is not contingent on capability.*

b. I agree with the view that "the Soviets perceive themselves as essentially equal in overall strategic power today." However, I cannot disagree with the view expounded by the PFIAB that the Soviets perceive themselves as "approaching the threshold of overall superiority in strategic power." My reason for this is that the terms "threshold" and "approaching" possess sufficient ambiguities to place uncertainty upon the time frame associated with this perception. In addition, you correctly imply that static measures of strategic forces which result in a superiority either in reality or in perception, will not negate the credibility of the U. S. deterrent.

c. Finally, I believe that the PFIAB report may not have gone far enough in recounting the force improvements taking place in the Soviet Union today. It is my view that the qualitative improvements underway have been stressed to the

DIA review(s) completed.

near exclusion of the quantitative improvements. Specifically, I mean the large increase in the number of RVs which the Soviets will soon possess, along with substantially increased throw-weight. While the MIRVing technology is certainly considered a qualitative improvement, the end result in this case is a quantitative increase in forces.



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Director